What is the “Special Needs Exception” to the Warrant Requirement?

By Risa S. Christensen

You are dispatched to a residence on a “keep the peace” type of call. You are called out to keep the peace while one party retrieves her personal belongings from her residence.  You enter the residence with the party and get sued for an unlawful entry and warrantless search by the other occupant who wasn’t present at the time.

The courts have consistently held that it is axiomatic that “physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.” The Supreme Court has recognized that “searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.” However, the Supreme Court has permitted exceptions to the warrant requirement when “special needs”, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.

Be careful though because the special needs doctrine applies only in exceptional circumstances and must be analyzed in the context of the specific factual circumstances involved in the case. It applies only where the court determines, first, that specific “special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement,” exist. If such a finding is made, the court must next determine whether these special needs make the warrant and probable-cause requirement of the Fourth Amendment impracticable in a given context. Only if the court makes both of these determinations is a court entitled to substitute its balancing of interests for that of the Framers.” Henderson v. City of Simi Valley, 305 F.3d 1052 (9^th Cir. 2002).

 Applicability of Special Needs Exception

The court will assess the particular “special need” involved in the particular situation.  This exception was upheld in the Henderson case (cited above), in which a minor, pursuant to California’s Domestic Violence Prevention Act, received a court order granting her the exclusive temporary use, control, and possession of all personal belongings.  The minor, Suzanne, removed these possessions with the assistance of law enforcement’s presence to “Keep the peace”, against her mother’s explicit directions.  The mother, Mrs. Henderson, sued the officers for unlawful entry and warrantless search, among other things.

In this case, the court said that keeping the peace while a minor child exercised her rights pursuant to a court order is not akin to typical law enforcement functions. Rather, the officers were serving as neutral third parties acting to protect all parties. The officers did not enter the house to obtain evidence of criminal wrongdoing.

Impracticability of Warrant Requirement

The officers argued that to require them to get a warrant in this situation would not only be impracticable, but superfluous. The officers already had a court order in their possession detailing the relevant restraints imposed and property rights protected. Requiring an additional warrant to effectuate the exercise of court-ordered property rights would accomplish no objective that was not already considered and incorporated into the Order. Moreover, the delay inherent in obtaining a warrant would make it more difficult for officers to respond quickly to potentially violent violations of the court order, an eventuality the court order was designed to prevent.

Impracticability of Probable Cause Requirement

Even more than the requirement of a warrant, a probable cause requirement would weaken the efficacy of the restraining order. Probable cause determinations are “peculiarly related to criminal investigations.” Probable cause determinations are peculiarly unsuited to the task of maintaining the peace while effectuating a court order in this situation.

Scope of Intrusion

The officers’ intrusion into the house was limited to those areas where entry was required to retrieve Suzanne’s property. The officers played no active role in Suzanne’s court-ordered foray. They merely stood by to prevent a breach of the peace while the court’s order was implemented. The officers’ conduct was consistent with their function as keepers of the peace.

CONCLUSION

The court strongly cautioned law enforcement in general against the assumption that police entry into a residence with a restraining order in hand will pass constitutional muster in all circumstances. In this case, it was significant that the police officers became involved only at Suzanne’s request, and their actions were limited to accompanying Suzanne while she retrieved her property. The court said this would be an entirely different case if the officers had targeted a suspect as part of a normal law enforcement investigation and then enlisted the help of a protected person as a subterfuge to search the suspect’s home without a warrant.

The court acknowledged that the entry did infringe upon Mrs. Henderson’s legitimate privacy expectations, but in this case, Mrs. Henderson’s privacy expectations did not outweigh the government’s compelling interests in maintaining peace and good order through enforcement of domestic violence orders.