by Brandi Harper
Everybody has seen the breaking news reports of high speed police chases. They are a common occurrence here in California and seem to interrupt any television program. They all end in different ways, either through police maneuvers or the suspect running out of gas, or in some instances, in crashes. However, many wonder what the liability of the police agency is in instances in which a suspect loses his life during the course of a high speed police chase. The Supreme Court, in County of Sacramento v. Lewis has provided the clearest answer as to liability for officers in this regard.
Factual Background
A Sacramento County Sheriff’s Deputy responded to a call to break a fight. Upon returning to their patrol car, they saw a motorcycle approaching at a high rate of speed. It was operated by 18-year old Brian Willard and carried Phillip Lewis, the 16-year old decedent as a passenger. Neither boy had anything to do with the fight that prompted the call to the police.
The officers attempted to pull the motorcycle over. The motorcyclist failed to stop and a pursuit at high speed began. For 75 seconds over a course of 1.3 miles, in a residential neighborhood, the motorcycle wove in and out of oncoming traffic and both the motorcycle and patrol car reached speeds of up to 100 miles per hour. The patrol car was following at a distance as short as a hundred feet. The chase ended when the motorcycle tipped over as Willard tried a sharp left turn. By the time the officer slammed on his brakes, Willard was out of the way, but Lewis was not. The patrol car skidded into him at 40 mph propelling him some 70 feet down the road and inflicting massive injuries. Lewis was pronounced dead at the scene.
The Summary of the Lawsuit
The parents of the motorcycle passenger killed brought a Section 1983 claim against the County, Sheriff’s Department, and Deputy, alleging deprivation of passenger’s substantive due process right to life. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California granted summary judgment for defendants, and the Court of Appeals reversed as to the Deputy. The Supreme Court held that (1) Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard did not apply, (2) high speed police chases with no intent to harm suspects physically do not give rise to liability under Fourth Amendment, and (3) allegations that pursuit was undertaken with deliberate indifference to passenger survival was insufficient to state substantive due process claim.
The Supreme Court’s Reasoning
The Supreme Court reviewed this case in order to resolve a conflict among the Circuits over the standard of culpability on the part of a law enforcement officer for violating substantive due process in a pursuit case. The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit. The Supreme Court determined that a deliberate indifference standard should not apply to high speed pursuits because officers do not have a chance to second guess. Therefore, the Court found that to be liable, an officer faced with making an immediate decision must have intended to physically harm the fleeing offender.
The Supreme Court’s opinion gave the following reasoning as to why the officer was not liable under § 1983. Smith was faced with a course of lawless behavior for which the police were not to blame. They had done nothing to cause Willard’s high-speed driving in the first place, nothing to excuse his flouting of the commonly understood law enforcement authority to control traffic, and nothing (beyond a refusal to call off the chase) to encourage him to race through traffic at breakneck speed forcing other drivers out of their travel lanes. Willard’s outrageous behavior was practically instantaneous, and so was Smith’s instinctive response. While prudence would have repressed the reaction, the officer’s instinct was to do his job as a law enforcement officer, not to induce Willard’s lawlessness, or to terrorize, cause harm, or kill. Prudence, that is, was subject to countervailing enforcement considerations, and while Smith exaggerated their demands, there is no reason to believe that they were tainted by an improper or malicious motive on his part.
Regardless whether Smith’s behavior offended the reasonableness held up by tort law or the balance struck in law enforcement’s own codes of sound practice, it does not shock the conscience, and the officers are not called upon to answer for it under § 1983.
Moral of the Story
In order for an officer to be liable for injuries sustained to an individual during a high speed chase, the plaintiff must show more than deliberate indifference. While this is not a license for officers to be reckless, it should allow officers the peace of mind to pursue suspects in high speed chases. However, it is important that officers comply with their department’s policies regarding high speed chases.
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